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1. INTRODUCTION
A central issue in the economics of innovation is how patent policy may a¤ect innova-
tive activities. The recent literature has examined this issue in the context of cumulative
innovation, where discoveries build on each other, under a standard assumption that rms
pursue innovations along a single research direction. In many industries, however, rms can
conduct R&D in multiple directions to achieve a specic goal, as, for example, the develop-
ment of a next generation color copier in the early 1990s by Fuji Xerox, of a new mobile
system by Ericsson in the mid-1990s, and of an X Terminal workstation by the Hewlett
Packard in the late 1980s (Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2001). The purpose of this paper is
to inquire how patent policy, specically patentability standards, may a¤ect the rate and
direction of cumulative innovation in an industry where rms can conduct R&D in multiple
directions.
We consider a situation where there are two research directions, A and B, for a sequence of
innovations (or new products) that deliver higher product qualities over time. The stochastic
quality improvement of an innovation in direction B has a higher variance than that in
direction A. Hence, if an innovation is patentable only when its quality improvement (or
innovation size) is su¢ ciently large, as for instance implied by the requirement of a minimum
inventive step, there will exist a range of quality thresholds or patentability standards (S),
under which an innovation is certainly patentable in direction A but not in direction B.
We will focus on patentability standards in the interior of such a range, and call A the safe
direction while B the risky direction.
If innovation is a one-time activity that ends with the successful introduction of a new
product, a (marginally) higher patentability standard would discourage R&D in B by mak-
ing it harder to obtain a patent and the rents associated with it through this direction,
which we shall call the threshold e¤ect, whereas it would have no impact on R&D in A,
provided that there are no (dis)economies of scope in R&D and that the return to a suc-
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cessful patentable discovery in one direction is not diminished by that in the other. In this
static setting, a higher S reduces industry R&D through the threshold e¤ect, and it also
allocates relatively more resources in direction A than in direction B, which can reduce the
expected size of innovation if, as we shall assume, a successful innovation through B has a
higher expected quality improvement than that through A.
The issue is more complex if innovations are cumulative, as we assume in this paper.
Specically, we consider the following model that builds on and extends Hunt (2004) by
having two research directions: Suppose that n+ 1 rms have entered an industry. At any
time, one of them is the leader and the other n rms are challengers. The challengers are
in a patent race to develop a new product that improves upon the current leaders. When
a challenger succeeds in a patentable innovation, it becomes the new leader to replace
the current one, who then joins the rank of challengers; and this process repeats itself
indenitely. In this dynamic setting, a marginal increase in the patentability standard will
increase the value of being a leader because it will take longer before the leader is replaced
by a successful challenger. This incumbency-prolonging e¤ect can potentially increase the
incentive for R&D in both A and B, even though the threshold e¤ect from a higher S will
still have a negative impact on the incentive for R&D in direction B.
Moreover, the changes in the R&D incentives in the two di¤erent directions will interact
with each other, giving rise to a dynamic strategic substitution e¤ect between the two
directions. In particular, an increase of R&D in direction B motivated by the incumbency-
prolonging e¤ect could reduce the incentive for R&D in direction A, and vice versa. This
turns out to be the crucial new force that leads to new e¤ects of patentability standards
under multiple research directions.
Finally, as we shall assume, a rm needs to incur a xed cost to enter the market in
order to conduct R&D and innovate. Therefore, patentability standards, by impacting the
expected return to R&D in each direction, also a¤ects the number of entrants in the free
entry equilibrium. Our analysis will examine how this market-structure e¤ect interacts with
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the other forces in the model.
We nd that as patentability standards rise, R&D intensity in direction B rst rises
and then falls, exhibiting an inverted-U shape, whereas R&D intensity in direction A is
U-shaped, initially decreasing and then increasing. Thus, the incumbency-prolonging e¤ect
is the dominating force in direction B when S is low, but it is dominated by the negative
threshold e¤ect when S is high. More surprising is that despite the positive impact from
the incumbency-prolonging e¤ect, increases in S initially lower R&D in direction A, due to
the strategic substitution e¤ect.
We also nd that as S increases, the industry rate of innovation initially goes up and
eventually falls down, reaching its maximum at some intermediate level. The market-
structure e¤ect plays a balancing role: there will be more rms when the expected return
from R&D investment is higher, which moderates the e¤ects of patentability standards on
R&D intensities both for each rm and for the industry.
We further compare the market equilibrium with the solutions that maximize social wel-
fare. First, in relation to the rst-best innovation rate, we show that R&D intensities and
the number of entrants in the free entry equilibrium are decient. This is due to the familiar
intuition that a rms private innovation incentive does not internalize the positive exter-
nalities to consumers.1 Second, compared to the rst-best innovation direction, we nd that
there exists a critical value of patentability standard, S^; such that the equilibrium R&D
direction coincides with the rst best when S = S^; and it is biased towards (against) the
risky direction when S is below (above) S^.2 For the second-best social welfare maximization
problem, in which a hypothetical social planner can only set the patentability standard but
not the R&D and entry activities of rms, the optimal S balances the two goals of moving
1Under competition, there can also be a business-stealing e¤ect that potentially results in excessive R&D
and entry. In our model, as in Hunt (2004), the externality to consumers dominates.
2 Intuitively, when S is low, innovations in direction B the risky direction are patentable even when the
quality improvement is small, which motives socially excessive R&D in B; relative to A: And the opposite
is true when S is high. Since we measure innovation or R&D direction by the ratio of R&D intensities in
the two directions, R&D can be e¢ cient in both A and B and yet biased towards one direction.
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towards the socially optimal innovation rate and towards the socially optimal innovation
direction. Thus, in general, the second best patentability standard will be di¤erent both
from S^ and from the S that maximizes the number of innovating rms.
Our paper is related to the existing theoretical literature on patents and cumulative inno-
vation, which has studied models with R&D along a single direction and o¤ered mixed nd-
ings on the e¤ects of patent protection. For example, ODonoghue (1998) and ODonoghue
et al. (1998) suggest that stronger patent protection has positive e¤ects on the rate of
innovation, provided that ex-ante agreement or contracting between innovators is e¢ cient,
whereas Bessen and Maskin (2009) and Segal and Whinston (2007) nd cases where the
e¤ects are negative. Horowitz and Lai (1996) consider a model in which longer patents
increase the size but decrease the frequency of the innovation. They show that the patent
length that maximizes the rate of innovation is nite (or intermediate).3 As we mentioned
earlier, our model is most closely related to Hunt (2004), who studies patentability and
cumulative innovation in a model with R&D only in one direction that corresponds to our
B. By allowing multiple R&D directions, we introduce the important dynamic substitution
e¤ect and o¤er several new insights. In particular, in contrast to the result in Hunt that
the patentability standard a¤ects innovation only through a market structure e¤ect, with
no impact on each innovating rms R&D intensity, we show that it also a¤ects innovation
through its impact on R&D intensities, in ways that are non-monotonic and somewhat un-
expected. Thus, in our model, patentability standards a¤ect industry innovation through
both the extensive margin (number of entrants) and the intensive margin (R&D intensities).
Moreover, our results on innovation (or R&D) direction are novel in this literature.
Our paper is also related to the literature on R&D portfolio, which has focused on the
issue of how competition may a¤ect the choice between safe and risky research projects for
3Chen et al. (2014) nd that stronger patent protection can a¤ect cumulative innovation either positively
or negatively, and the e¤ect is generally non-monotonic. Empirically, some recent studies on cumulative
innovation (Murray et al., 2008; Furman and Stern, 2011; Galasso and Schankerman, 2013; Williams, 2013;
Sampat and Williams, 2014) nd no evidence of a relationship.
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a stand-alone innovation.4 Some authors have found, under the assumption of winner-take-
all, that competition leads to over-investment in risky R&D projects because it magnies
the negative externality of investment by one rm on other rmsprobability to win the
patent (e.g., Bhattacharya and Mookherjee, 1986; Klette and de Meza, 1986; Dasgupta
and Maskin, 1987). Others, however, have argued that investment in risky R&D project
decreases with the strength of competition, because the negative externality of the risky
R&D becomes small when competition strengthens, if each rm pursues multiple patents
(Cabral, 1994; Kwon, 2010).5 Anderson and Cabral (2007) study a game where rms choose
the variance of a stochastic innovation outcome. They nd that the level of equilibrium
variance may be greater, smaller, or equal to the social optimum. Our paper contributes to
this literature by examining the e¤ect of patent policy on R&D portfolio and by considering
cumulative innovations.
In the rest of the paper, we describe our model and its equilibrium in Section 2. In
Section 3, we establish our results on how the patentability standard a¤ects the rates of
innovation, as measured by the R&D intensities of each rm in the two directions and by
the overall R&D intensity of the industry, and how it a¤ects the direction of innovation,
as measured by the ratio of the innovation rates in the two directions. Section 4 contains
our welfare results, comparing the equilibrium rate and direction of innovation with the
social optimum, and discussing optimal patentability policy as the second best. Section 5
concludes. The main theoretical results are illustrated through a numerical example, and
proofs that are more technical in nature are relegated to the appendix.
4Relatedly, Choi and Gerlach (2014) study the R&D choice between easy and di¢ cult projects that are
complementary for the production of a nal product. They nd that rms tend to invest excessively on the
easy innovation due to hold-up problems.
5Unlike the other papers, Kwon (2010) considers complementary projects basic and applied research.
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2. THE MODEL
Time is continuous and is divided into periods, t = 0; 1; 2; :::; between stochastic dis-
coveries by innovating rms. There are n + 1 rms in the industry, one of whom is the
incumbent and the others are challengers in each period. At period t; the incumbent,
through a patented innovation at an earlier period, can produce a product that has quality
qt. Each of the challengers conducts R&D to further improve the product quality.
There are two possible research directions for the challengers, A and B. A successful
innovation through direction A will result in a certain quality improvement, A:6 A suc-
cessful innovation through direction B will yield an uncertain quality improvement, B,
which is a random variable with cumulative distribution function G () and continuous den-
sity g () on support B;B : As we pointed out before, this formulation follows closely
Hunt (2004), with the main di¤erence being that he considers R&D only along a single
uncertain direction corresponding to B here:
A challenger decides on a R&D portfolio by choosing the R&D intensity in each of the two
directions. We assume that each innovation occurs according to a Poisson process. The cost
for a challenger to maintain an arrival rate z in research direction z 2 fA;Bg is C (z) ;
which is strictly increasing and twice continuously di¤erentiable, with C (0) = C 0 (0) = 0,
C 00 () > 0; and limz!1C 0 (z) = 1.7 We shall also refer to z as the R&D intensity in
direction z:
The statutory life of a patent is assumed to be innite, even though the patent life
e¤ectively ends when the next patentable invention occurs. To be awarded a patent, the
quality improvement from an invention needs to meet a minimum improvement size, or
the patentability standard, S: In practice, the patentability standard (or requirement) can
6We can allow A to be stochastic, as long as its variance is su¢ ciently small. For convenience, we
assume A to be a constant.
7Notice that we allow the corner case where each rm chooses to conduct R&D only in one direction
among the alternatives available. Under our assumptions on the cost function, however, the equilibrium will
be interior.
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correspond to the requirement of non-obviousness in the American patent code, or of the
inventive step in Europe. For the purpose of this paper, we assume that S 2 B; B and
S < A: Thus, an innovation achieved through direction A is always patentable, whereas
  1   G (S) is the probability that an innovation in direction B is granted a patent.
When an innovation is not protected by a patent, it becomes freely available to the public,
in which case we assume that competition drives the prot from marketing the product to
zero. Notice that the more stringent the patentability requirement, other things equal, the
smaller the probability that the challenger can protably market her innovation achieved
through direction B.
We assume that at the beginning of period t = 0; there is a large number of rms, each
deciding whether to pay a one-time xed investment cost k to enter the market. Thus,
the number of challengers, n; is endogenously determined by the free-entry condition. If a
challenger wins the race for a patentable innovation, it becomes the incumbent in the next
period, and the previous incumbent becomes a challenger. If a challenger succeeds in an
innovation that does not meet the patentability standard, then the incumbent maintains its
leader position, and all n+ 1 rms enter into a new period of patent race. The innovation
arrival rates and the costs to achieve them remain the same after any discovery, whether
patentable or not. Therefore, in either case, the relative positions of the n+ 1 rms in the
market are the same, and hence the choice problem for any rm in the market is stationary.
We denote the discount rate, common for all rms, by r:
The market contains a representative consumer, who demands one unit of the product per
period. The consumers valuation for a product is equal to its quality. The marginal cost of
production for any rm is normalized to zero. The incumbent and the challengers engage
in price competition. Thus, when the incumbents product quality exceeds the next closest
quality by ; its ow prot is exactly  until the arrival of a new patentable innovation.
The challengers earn no ow prot.
As in Hunt (2004) and other studies in this literature, we shall focus on an equilibrium
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where only challengers, but not the incumbent, will invest in R&D. Incumbents tend to have
lower incentive to invest in R&D than entrants due to their existing prot. The assumption
that they make no investment is more extreme, and it is motivated mainly for analytical
tractability. Notice that in our model, players rotate their roles as the incumbent and the
challengers over time, so a rm may only temporarily stop investing. In our analysis that
follows, by construction, the strategies by the challengers and the incumbent will constitute
a stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE).8
We shall maintain the following assumption throughout the paper:
B < rk < A < E [B] 
Z B
B
BdG (B) ; (A1)
because of two considerations: First, we are interested in situations where a successful
innovation in the risky direction yields a higher expected quality improvement, which is
captured by A < E [B] : Second, we wish to ensure that a positive number of rms will
be willing to enter the market to pursue innovation in each direction, which will require
B < rk < A:
If a challenger innovates through direction A; she becomes an incumbent and receives a
prot ow of
A = A (1)
until she is replaced by a future challenger. If the challenger succeeds in innovation direction
B; the expected prot ow (conditional on the innovation being patentable) is
B =
R B
S BdG (B)
1 G (S) : (2)
8There could potentially be another equilibrium where an incumbent from direction B may conduct R&D
if the realized B > S is relatively small, but its analysis appears to be untractable.
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Notice that
@B
@S
=
 Sg (S) [1 G (S)] + g (S) R BS BdG (B)
[1 G (S)]2 =
g (S)
1 G (S) (B   S)  0;
where B  S because
Z B
S
BdG (B) 
Z B
S
SdG (B) = S [1 G (S)] :
It follows that
B  B (S)  B (B) = E [B] :
This, together with (1) and assumption (A1), implies that B > A > rk > B. Thus,
entry to pursue innovation in each direction can be potentially protable. The equilibrium
number of entrants in the market will be determined simultaneously as the arrival rate of
innovation in each direction, as we show next.
At a stationary MPE, let V Iz be the value of being an incumbent through type-z innovation
and V E the value of being a challenger, all of which are evaluated at the beginning of a
period. Then V IA; V
I
B and V
E satisfy9:
rV IA = A + n (A + B)
 
V E   V IA

; (3)
rV IB = B + n (A + B)
 
V E   V IB

; (4)
and
rV E = A
 
V IA   V E
  CA (A) + B  V IB   V E  CB (B) : (5)
Equations (3), (4) and (5) suggest that the value of being an incumbent depends on the
9Notice that the probability that any two innovations succeed simultaneously is zero. Because we are
constructing an equilibrium in which the incumbent does not invest, no matter what its realized quality
improvement is, the value function V IB below is not contingent on the realization of B .
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type of innovation that has led to the incumbency.10
From (5), the challenger chooses optimal A and B; which respectively satisfy the rst-
order conditions:11
C 0A (A) = V
I
A   V E ; (6)
and
C 0B (B) = 
 
V IB   V E

: (7)
The free entry condition implies
V E = k: (8)
From (3), (6) and (8), we nd
V IA   V E =
A   rk
r + n(A + B)
= C 0A (A) : (9)
Similarly, from (4), (7) and (8), we have
V IB   V E =
B   rk
r + n(A + B)
=
C 0B (B)

: (10)
Substituting (9) and (10) into (5) yields
AC
0
A (A) + BC
0
B (B)  CA (A)  CB (B)  rk = 0: (11)
The system of equations, (9), (10) and (11), determine the three equilibrium values A, 

B
and n; which we assume to exist uniquely. In particular, from (9) and (10), the equilibrium
10Note that the size of quality improvement appears with the corresponding probability, even though the
incumbent knows its exact value after innovation is successful. Hence B is shown in the right hand of (4).
11The properties of the cost functions ensure that the second-order conditions are satised.
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number of challengers can be expressed as
n =

A   rk
C 0A (

A)
  r

 1
A + 

B
=

 (B   rk)
C 0B (

B)
  r

 1
A + 

B
: (12)
We illustrate the equilibrium of the model with the following example:
Example 1. Suppose that B follows the uniform distribution on [0; 1], while CA (A) =
1
2
2
A and CB (B) =
1
2
2
B: Then, from (9), (10) and (11):
A =
(A   rk)
(1  S)  1+S2   rk
vuuut 2rk (A rk)
(1 S)( 1+S2  rk)
2
+ 1
; B =
vuuut 2rk (A rk)
(1 S)( 1+S2  rk)
2
+ 1
;
and
n =

2 (A   rk)
A
  r
 
1
B + (1  S)A

:
Further assuming A = 0:3; r = 0:05; k = 0:9; and S = 0:1; we have A = 0:147; 

B =
0:261 63; and n = 8: 68:
We shall continue with this example to also illustrate results in the following sections.
3. THE RATES AND DIRECTION OF INNOVATION
We are now in a position to examine how the patentability standard, S; may a¤ect the
rates and direction of innovation. We rst consider the e¤ects of S on the equilibrium R&D
intensities, A and 

B, which can be viewed as each entrants innovation rates in directions
A and B; respectively. Recall that A, 

B and n
 are determined by (9), (10) and (11). In
the appendix, we show the following by using the Cramers rule:
@A
@S
=
g(S)B(

A + 

B) [C
0
A (

A)]
2C
00
B (

B) (rk   S)
jM j (13)
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and
@B
@S
=
 g(S)A(A + B) [C 0A (A)]2C
00
A (

A) (rk   S)
jM j ; (14)
where
jM j =  (A + B)C 0 (B)C
00
(A)C
00
(B) [

A(A   rk) + B(B   rk)] < 0
since B > A > rk. Thus, if S < rk; then
@A
@S < 0 and
@B
@S > 0; while if S > rk; then
@A
@S > 0 and
@B
@S < 0: This leads to the following result, where we dene
d (S)  

B
A
(15)
as the innovation direction.
Proposition 1 As S increases, B rst increases and then decreases, whereas 

A rst
decreases and then increases, reaching the maximum and the minimum, respectively, at S 
rk. Moreover, innovation direction d (S) has an inverted-U shape; maximized at S = rk.
Interestingly, R&D intensities in both directions vary non-monotonic with S, in contrast
to the result in Hunt (2004) that R&D intensity is invariant with the patentability standard.
As we discussed in the introduction, the presence of two research directions in our model
introduced a strategic substitution e¤ect. When the R&D intensity in one direction becomes
higher (or lower), it exerts an opposite force on the R&D intensity in the other direction.
Thus, in the free entry equilibrium of our model, patentability standards impact industry
R&D not only through the number of rms (the extensive margin), but also through changes
in the R&D intensities in di¤erent directions (the intensive margin). Notice that in (14), if
A = 0, then 

B would be independent of S; and our results would be the same as Hunts.
12
12See the equation after (A.7) on pp. 421 in Hunt (2004), except that, in Hunt, (i) there is an industry-
specic productivity parameter, which we assume to be 1; and (ii) the reservation value of the product is
the level of its quality multiplied by p, and we assume p = 1.
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In our model, innovation direction, d (S) ; is measured by each challengers R&D intensity
in the risky direction relative to that in the safe direction, which determines the relative
rates of innovation achieved through the two directions. The inverted-U shaped d (S) ; with
its maximum attained at S = rk; follows directly from the shapes of B (S) and 

A (S) :
Since the expected size of each innovation is higher in direction B than in direction A; one
might think that it would be desirable to choose S = rk: However, the overall expected
innovation rate of each challenger,
  AA + BE [B] ;
depends also on how di¤erent B (S) and 

A (S) are. Hence,  may not be maximized at
rk: For the industry innovation rate, we need to further consider the number of entrants in
equilibrium (n), which is also a function of S:
The equilibrium overall innovation rate of the industry can be dened as:
R  n: (16)
The result below indicates that the shape of R  R (S) is consistent with that of d (S).
Proposition 2 As S rises, R initially increases and eventually decreases; reaching its max-
imum when S is at some intermediate level.
Proof. See the appendix.
As in Hunt (2004), the industry rate of innovation (R) is maximized when the patentabil-
ity standard is neither too high nor too low. However, the channels through which S a¤ects
R di¤er in the two models. In Hunt, as S increases, the equilibrium number of rms to
conduct R&D in the market rst increases and then decreases, whereas the equilibrium
R&D intensity remains unchanged. Our model entails a second channel: the changes in the
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R&D intensities, since
@R
@S
= n
@
@S
+ 
@n
@S
;
and in our model, A and 

B and hence also  in general vary with S.
Dene SR as the patentability requirement that maximizes the innovation rate of the
industry R = R (S):
SR = arg max fR (S)g :
In the appendix, we show that
@R
@S
jS=rk > 0; (17)
which immediately leads to:
Remark 1 If R is a single-peaked function of S; then SR > rk:
Therefore, the patentability standard that maximizes the overall rate of innovation in the
industry is higher than S = rk; which maximizes B; provided that R (S) is single-peaked.
Continuing with Example 1, we next illustrate Proposition 1 by showing how A and 

B
vary with S:
Example 1 (Continue). Assume that the parameter values are as assumed in Example
1, except now S is allowed to vary. Then:
A = 0:153
r
1
S4   0:18S3   1: 811 9S2 + 0:163 8S + 1: 088 2 ;
B = 0:3 (S + 0:91) (1  S)
r
1
S4   0:18S3   1: 811 9S2 + 0:163 8S + 1: 088 2 :
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Figures 1 and 2 below illustrate A and 

B as functions of S; where rk = 0:045:
Figure 1: Figure 2:
A (S) 

B (S)
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14
0.1465
0.1470
0.1475
0.1480
S 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14
0.2612
0.2614
0.2616
0.2618
S
4. EFFICIENT INNOVATION INCENTIVE AND OPTIMAL S
In this section, we compare the equilibrium and the e¢ cient incentives for cumulative
innovation, where e¢ cient means welfare-maximizing or the rst-best; and we study
how to choose S optimally at the market equilibrium. Specically, we seek to answer two
questions. First, if one could directly choose the number of entrants and the R&D intensities
to maximize social welfare, what would be these choices and how would they di¤er from
those in the market equilibrium? Second, if policy can choose patentability standards, but
not rmsinnovative activities, what should be the optimal S? Subsection 4.1 addresses the
two questions in terms of the values for A; B; and n; while subsection 4.2 considers the
questions from the perspective of innovation directions.
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4.1 Comparing R&D Intensities and the Number of Entrants
When there are n challengers, each choosing R&D intensities A and B in directions A
and B; respectively, total welfare is
W =
n
r

A
A
r
  CA (A) + BE [B]
r
  CB (B)  rk

; (18)
where Ar and
E[B ]
r are the expected social values of innovations generated by one innovat-
ing rm through directions A and B; respectively. The expression inside the square brackets
in (18) is thus the instantaneous social benet from one innovating rm, and there are n
independent innovating rms for the industry, multiplied by 1r to account for the discounted
sum of the instantaneous benets.
At the rst best where a hypothetical social planner directly chooses A; B and n to
maximize W; the welfare-maximizing oA and 
o
B satisfy the following rst-order conditions:
C 0 (oA) =
A
r
and C 0 (oB) =
E [B]
r
: (19)
Notice that the e¢ cient R&D intensities equate their marginal social benets and costs.
Comparing (19) to (9) and (10) and noticing that
 (B   rk) =
Z B
S
BdG (B)  rk < E [B] ; (20)
we nd that the e¢ cient R&D intensities are higher than those in the free entry equilibrium:
oz > 

z; for z = A;B. Intuitively, this is because when choosing R&D intensities in the
market equilibrium, a rm does not internalize the positive externalities of its innovation
to consumers.
Moreover, since zC 0z (z)   C (z) increases in z and oz > z for z = A;B; utilizing
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(19) and (11), we have
oA
A
r
  CA (oA) + oB
E [B]
r
  CB (oB)  rk
= oAC
0
A (
o
A)  CA (oA) + oBC 0B (oB)  CB (oB)  rk
> AC
0
A (

A)  CA (A) + BC 0B (B)  CB (B)  rk = 0: (21)
Hence, as in Hunt (2004), the e¢ cient number of rms is no =1 > n.
Summarizing the discussions above, we have:
Proposition 3 Compared to the rst-best, R&D intensities and the number of entrants are
decient under the free entry equilibrium.
When policy can choose the patentability standard whereas rms choose R&D intensities
under free entry to maximize their private benets, the optimal choice of S is also called
the second-best problem. LetW (S) be the welfare in equilibrium at the second best: Then,
from (18),
@W (S)
@S
=
1
r
@n
@S

A
A
r
  CA (A) + B
E [B]
r
  CB (B)  rk

+
n
r

A
r
  C 0A (A)

@A
@S
+

E [B]
r
  C 0B (B)

@B
@S

: (22)
The optimal patentability standard, denoted by S; coincides with the one that maximizes
the number of entrants in Hunt (2004) if A  0: To see this, notice that if A  0, our
model reduces to that in Hunt (2004), implying @

A
@S = 0; and by (14)
@B
@S = 0: Hence,
@W (S)
@S = 0 implies
@n
@S = 0. However, in our model

A
r
  C 0A (A)

@A
@S
+

E [B]
r
  C 0B (B)

@B
@S

is generally not zero when @n

@S = 0; and thus the optimal patentability standard generally
di¤ers from the one that maximizes n.
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From Remark 1, the S that maximizes the industry innovation rate (R) exceeds rk;
provided that R is a single-peaked function of S: If W is a single-peaked function of S; then
S also exceeds rk: To see this, note that, from (9), (10) and (20),
C 0A (

A) <
A
r
and C 0B (

B) <
 (B   rk)
r
<
E [B]
r
:
Thus, noticing @

A
@S jS=rk =
@B
@S jS=rk = 0 and @n

@S jS=rk > 0, we have
@W
@S
jS=rk = 1
r
@n
@S
jS=rk

A
A
r
  CA (A) + B
EB
r
  CB (B)  rk

>
1
r
@n
@S
jS=rk

AC
0
A (

A)  CA (A) + BC 0B (B)  CB (B)  rk

= 0;
where the equality follows from (11).
Summarizing the above discussion, we have:
Remark 2 As a second-best, the patentability standard that maximizes W  W (S) ; S;
generally does not maximize the number of rms in the industry. Furthermore, if W (S) is
single-peaked, then S > rk:
Therefore, even though the expected quality improvement from an innovation is higher
in direction B than in direction A, under the single-peak condition, the welfare-maximizing
S does not maximize innovation in direction B: This is because by raising S above rk;
industry innovation can be increased.
Notice that for S to be a valid solution to the maximization problem for W (S) ; we
have implicitly assumed that S  A: If this constraint is binding, then we would have
S = A: This is because if S > A; then no entrant would conduct R&D in direction A; so
that A = 0 and the problem is the same as if B were the only research direction: But since
C 0A (0) = 0 by assumption, it is socially desirable to have strictly positive R&D investment
19
in direction A: This implies that W (S) would jump down at S = A: Therefore, it is likely
that S  A even if we allow S to be larger than A:
4.2 Comparing the Innovation Directions
We now compare the equilibrium innovation direction d (S) with the innovation direction
that maximizes social welfare, do: From (19), we have
do =
oB
oA
; where
C 0 (oB)
C 0 (oA)
=
E [B]
A
:
Hence, at the welfare-maximizing innovation direction, the ratio of the marginal costs equals
the ratio of the marginal benets of innovations in the two directions.
Recall from Proposition 1 that the equilibrium innovation direction d (S) is maximized
at S = rk: The result below states that rms are biased towards (against) innovation in
direction B when S is below (above) some threshold. A sketch of the proof is as follows:
If S = B; we have d (S) > d
o; with a bias towards B: As S increases but is smaller than
rk, innovation is even more biased towards B because, from Proposition 1, B=

A increases
in S if S < rk: As S further increases and surpasses rk; B starts to decrease and 

A to
increase, and thus d (S) becomes smaller but can still be larger than do: When S > S^; the
threshold value of S; d (S) falls below do and monotonically decreases, so that innovation
direction is biased towards A: Formally:
Proposition 4 There exists S^ 2 B;B such that dS^ = do; with d (S) > do if S < S^
but d (S) < do if S > S^: Moreover, S^ > rk:
Proof. From (19), under the social optimum,
C 0B (
o
B)
C 0A (
o
A)
=
EB
A
:
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From (9) and (10), given S; in the free-entry equilibrium
C 0B (

B (S))
C 0A (

A (S))
=
 (S) [B (S)  rk]
A   rk :
Thus,
 (S) 
C0B(

B(S))
C0A(

A(S))
C0B(
o
B)
C0A(
o
A)
=
 (S) [B (S)  rk]
E [B]
A rk
A
:
As S increases,
 (S)   (S) [B (S)  rk]
rst increases and then decreases, reaching its maximum at S = rk; because, since  (S) =
1 G (S) ;
@ (S)
@S
=
@
@S
[B (S)  rk] +  (S) @B (S)
@S
=  g (S) [B (S)  rk] +  (S) g (S) [B (S)  S]
1 G (S)
=  g (S) (S   rk) :
Moreover,  (B) = E [B]   rk > 0 and 
 
B

= 0: Therefore, there exists a unique
S^ > rk; determined by


S^

= E [B]
A   rk
A
< E [B] ;
such that 

S^

= 1; with
d

S^

=
B

S^

A

S^
 = oB
oA
= do:
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Moreover, since
 (B) =
 (B)
E [B]
A rk
A
=
E [B]  rk
E [B]
A rk
A
=
1  rkE[B ]
1  rkA
> 1
and 

B(S)
A(S)
 hence  (S) increases for S 2 [B; rk) but decreases for S 2

rk; S^

; we have
 (S) > 1 and 

B(S)
A(S)
> do if S < S^: Also, since B (S) decreases in S while 

A (S) increases
in S for S > rk; we have  (S) < 1 and 

B(S)
A(S)
< do if S > S^:
Therefore, S^ implements the welfare-maximizing innovation direction, provided that S^ 
A; innovation is biased towards B when S < S^; whereas it is biased towards A when
S > S^: Intuitively, when the patentability standard is relatively low, the risky research
direction with uncertain innovation size is likely to yield a patent even when the quality
improvement is small, which motivates rms to conduct R&D in that direction excessively
relative to the direction with a certain innovation size. Conversely, when the patentability
standard is high enough, the direction with uncertain innovation size is unlikely to receive
a patent even when the quality improvement is relatively large, which unduly discourages
R&D in that direction.
Notice that while S^ leads to the e¢ cient choice of research direction, it need not be the
welfare-maximizing S for W (S) in the second-best problem. This is because S also a¤ects
W (S) through n (S) ; as can be seen from (22), and thus S^ need not maximize W (S) :
Intuitively, the second-best choice of S; S; will generally involve a trade o¤ between two
policy goals: moving towards the e¢ cient R&D direction (do) and towards the e¢ cient
number of entrants (no). When S achieves the e¢ cient R&D direction, as S^ does, it does
not optimally balance the two goals, and hence in general S^ does not maximize W (S) (i.e.
S^ 6= S).
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4.3 Example
To illustrate the results in this section, we continuing with example 1:
Example 1 (Continue). First, as an illustration of Remark 2. we nd that W (S) is
maximized at S = S = 0:272; whereas n (S) is maximized at S = 0:269:
Next,
oA =
A
r
=
0:3
0:05
= 6; oB =
E [B]
r
=
0:5
0:05
= 10; do =
5
3
= 1:67:
Recall from Section 3 that A = 0:147; 

B = 0:261 63; and n
 = 8: 68: Therefore A < 
o
A;
B < 
o
B; and n
 < no =1; illustrating Proposition 3.
Notice that
 (S) [B (S)  rk] = (1  S)
 R 1
S xdx
1  S  
45
1000
!
=
1
200
(100S + 91) (1  S) ;
E [B]
A   rk
A
= 0:5
0:3  0:045
0:3
= 0:425:
Thus, from
1
200
(100S + 91) (1  S) = 0:50:3  0:045
0:3
;
we nd S^ = 0:294; such that d (S) > do if S < S^ but d (S) < do if S > S^: Notice that
in this example, to maximize W (S) ; S = 0:272; which is lower than S^: Figure 3 displays
the curve for d (S) : As predicted in Proposition 1, d (S) initially increases in S; reaching its
maximum at rk = 0:045; and decreases thereafter.
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Figure 3: Innovation Direction d (S)
5. CONCLUSION
This paper has provided a rst look at how patent policy may impact the rate and
direction of cumulative innovation when rms can conduct R&D in multiple directions. We
have three main ndings: (i) Patentability standards a¤ect the rate of industry innovation
through both the number of entrants and their R&D intensities in the free entry equilibrium.
As S rises, the rate of industry innovation initially increases and eventually decreases. (ii)
Compared to the social optimum, market incentives for cumulative innovation are decient
for both R&D intensities and the number of entrants. (iii) There exists a critical level of
patentability standard (S^) under which the innovation direction is e¢ cient, whereas R&D
is biased towards (against) the risky direction when S is below (above) S^: However, if S
is the only policy variable available, then the optimal policy, which balances the trade-o¤
between the rate and direction of innovation, will in general be di¤erent from S^:
Discussions about patent policy and the patent system have frequently surrounded the
issue of patentability standards. It has been argued that patentability standards in the
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U.S. are too low, leading to excessive incentives for small-size innovations (e.g., Hunt, 2004;
Ja¤e, 2000). Our results suggest that raising patentability standards may indeed improve
innovation direction, with two caveats: rst, the e¤ect of a higher S on innovation direction
may be non-monotonic, and a small increase in S can either alleviate or exacerbate possible
direction biases depending on the starting point; second, in our model, the risky direction
may lead to more small-size innovations but to a higher expected size than the safe direction.
Hence, even when raising S reduces the patenting of small-size innovations, it may not raise
the expected innovation size.
In our model, the xed setup cost for R&D (adjusted by r), rk; plays important roles
in determining the innovation incentives and the optimal patentability standards. This
cost generally di¤ers for di¤erent industries. For instance, it is likely much larger in the
pharmaceutical industry than in the software industry. Thus, it would be desirable that
patentability standards di¤er for di¤erent industries, depending (indirectly) on the setup
cost for R&D projects. Moreover, innovations in developing countries tend to be much
below the world technology frontier and require lower setup cost rk than those in devel-
oped countries. Then, the desirable patentability requirement could be lower in developing
countries in order to promote innovation.13
For tractability, we have studied a highly stylized model. It would be desirable for future
research to extend our analysis to more general situations, especially to settings where
incumbents and challengers both make R&D investments. It would also be interesting to
consider other patent policy instruments, including patent strength aimed at preventing
imitations. Our framework of cumulative innovation with multiple R&D directions can be
a useful starting point for these and other studies.
13Chen and Puttitanun (2005) shows how intellectual property rights (IPRs) a¤ect innovations in devel-
oping countries and how the optimal IPRs policy may vary with a countrys level of development.
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APPENDIX
The appendix contains proofs for Proposition 1, Proposition 2, and inequality (17).
Proof of Proposition 1. From (9), (11), and (10), the equilibrium A; 

B and n
 solve
the system of equations below:
M 
M1  C 0A (A) [r + n(A + B)]  (A   rk)
M2  AC 0A (A) + BC 0B (B)  CA (A)  CB (B)  rk
M3  C 0A (A) (B   rk)  C 0B (B) (A   rk)
= 0
Let M ij  @M
i
@j ; for i = 1; 2; 3 and j = A; B; S; n. Dene jMAS j ; jMBS j ; jMnS j and jM j
as the determinants of matrix MAS ; MBS ; MnS and M , respectively:
jMAS j =

M1S M
1
B
M1n
M2S M
2
B
M2n
M3S M
3
B
M3n

; jMBS j =

M1A M
1
S M
1
n
M2A M
2
S M
2
n
M3A M
3
S M
3
n

;
jMnS j =

M1A M
1
B
M1S
M2A M
2
B
M2S
M3A M
3
B
M3S

; and jM j =

M1A M
1
B
M1n
M2A M
2
B
M2n
M3A M
3
B
M3n

:
By Cramers rule, we have
@A
@S
=  jMAS jjM j and
@B
@S
=  jMBS jjM j :
We next compute the relevant derivatives:
M1A = [r + n(A + B)]C
00
A (A) + nC
0
A (A) ; M
1
B
= nC 0A (A) ;
M1n = (A + B)C
0
A (A) ; M
1
S =  g(S)nBC 0A (A) ;
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M2A = AC
00
A (A) ; M
2
B
= BC
00
B (B) ; M
2
n = 0; M
2
S = 0;
M3A = (B   rk)C
00
A (A) ; M
3
B
=  (A   rk)C 00B (B) ;
M3n = 0; M
3
S = g(S)C
0
A (A) (rk   lS):
Thus,
jMAS j = M1SM2BM3n +M1BM2nM3S +M1nM2SM3B  M1nM2BM3S  M1BM2SM3n  M1SM2nM3B
=  g(S)B(A + B)
 
C 0A
2
C
00
B(rk   S);
jMBS j = M1AM2SM3n +M1SM2nM3A +M1nM2AM3S  M1nM2SM3A  M1SM2AM3n  M1AM2nM3S
= g(S)A(A + B)
 
C 0A
2
C
00
A(rk   S);
and
jM j = M1AM2BM3n +M1BM2nM3A +M1nM2AM3B  M1nM2BM3A  M1BM2AM3n  M1AM2nM3B
=  (A + B)C 0BC
00
AC
00
B[A(A   rk) + B(B   rk)] < 0:
Therefore,
@A
@S
=  jMAS jjM j =
g(S)B(

A + 

B) (C
0
A)
2C
00
B(rk   S)
jM j ;
and
@B
@S
=  jMBS jjM j =
 g(S)A(A + B) (C 0A)2C
00
A(rk   S)
jM j :
It follows that @

B
@S > 0 and
@A
@S < 0 if S < rk and
@B
@S < 0 and
@A
@S > 0 if rk < S.
This further implies that B=

A; same as 

B; is an inverted-U function of S; maximized at
S = rk:
30
Proof of Proposition 2. By Cramers rule,
@n
@S
=  jMnS jjM j :
where
jMnS j = g(S)C 0AC
00
AC
00
B
8><>: nB[A(A   rk) + B(B   rk)]+B(rk   S)[r + n(A + B)]
9>=>; (23)
+g(S)n
 
C 0A
2 
BC
00
B   AC
00
A

](rk   S):
From (13), (14) and (23), we can show that, after substitution and simplication,
@R
@S
= (AA+BEB)
@n
@S
+A
@A
@S
+EB
@B
@S
=
 g(S)C 0A
8>>>><>>>>:
(AA + BEB)C
00
AC
00
BB[nA(A   S)
+nB(B   S) + r(rk   S)]
+nC 0A(EB   A)

2AC
00
A + 
2
BC
00
B

(rk   S)
9>>>>=>>>>;
jM j : (24)
Note that EB > A since   1: If S = B; then S < min fA; B; rkg and EB  
A > 0: It follows that @R@S jS=B > 0: If S = B; then S > max fA; B; rkg and we have
@R
@S jS=B < 0.
Proof of (17). From (24),
@R
@S
jS=rk =  g(S)C
0
A
jM j (AA + BEB)C
00
AC
00
BB[nA(A   rk) + nB(B   rk)] > 0:
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